
Insight
On 14 January 2025, the High Court dismissed a claim for professional negligence and misconduct brought against KPMG LLP and one of its partners. This was the court’s response to KPMG’s application to strike out the claim on grounds of abuse of process and lack of merit.
The claim was valued at over £1.2 billion and the High Court agreed definitively with KPMG, concluding that the claim was an attempt to re-litigate previously decided issues. This case demonstrates the court reluctance to entertain abusive litigation.
Mr Bashar Bin Mahmood, a property developer, was a director, shareholder and guarantor of various insolvent companies for which KPMG was appointed as administrators. In 2023, Mr Mahmood brought a claim in the Central London County Court against KPMG and partner Mr Costley-Wood, alleging professional negligence and misconduct in the administration of several of the insolvent companies.
The first claim was struck out in July 2023, with the Court finding it to be without merit.
In response, Mr Mahmood decided to initiate fresh proceedings in the High Court, in January 2024, making the same allegations. KPMG applied for strike out and summary judgment of the claim (i.e. a dismissal of the claim without the need for trial, on the basis that it is either an abuse of process or the prospects are so low that the claimant had no real prospect of success).
There are a number of elements that a claimant needs to establish in order to be successful in a professional negligence claim, none of which were present in Mr Mahmood’s claim. The court concluded that, on the basis that these elements were not present, the claim had no real prospect of success and therefore, in conjunction with a number of other considerations, the court had no choice but to dismiss the claim.
The reasons that the court gave for dismissing the claim, are as follows:
The court’s ruling in this case was definitive and clear. It is a helpful illustration of how the courts deal with claims which are not genuine and / or which are baseless. More specifically, it provides for the following lessons:
There are many different rules in litigation, procedural and legal. It is easy to get things wrong and you should therefore always consider obtaining legal advice at the outset of a legal dispute. Our team at Thomson Snell & Passmore is here to help.
In February 2025, the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal made by EE Limited following the High Court’s dismissal of its claim in 2023.
In its claim, EE alleged breach of contract against Virgin Mobile, and at the centre of the case was the interpretation of an exclusion clause.
Pursuant to an agreement for services entered into by the parties, EE agreed to provide Virgin Mobile with access to EE’s mobile network, providing it with 2G to 4G (but not 5G) services.
In its claim, EE alleged that Virgin had breached an obligation of exclusivity owed under the contract between the parties. EE said that, because Virgin had migrated customers to services on a different network , EE had suffered a loss, that loss being the sums which Virgin would have been obliged to pay under the contract, had they not migrated those customers.
Virgin denied the claim, including on grounds that there had been no exclusivity breach. Virgin said that only 5G customers had been migrated (which was permissible) but in any event the claim was precluded by an exclusion clause providing that neither party could claim for “anticipated profits”. EE however said that it was not claiming for “anticipated profits”, rather “charges unlawfully avoided”.
At first instance and at appeal, the courts found that the exclusion clause did prevent EE from bringing its claim.
The core issue was whether a claim in respect of anticipated profits meant, on the true interpretation of the exclusion clause, a claim for loss of profit other than expectation loss.
Showing the importance of carefully drafted contracts and the differing interpretations that can be offered, the court of appeal made their decision 2:1 with Lord Justice Phillips giving a dissenting judgment (i.e. one which goes against the decision).
The court held that EE’s claim was excluded by the terms of the contract. It was held that “charges unlawfully avoided” could only be a claim for loss of profit and there was no distinction.
When considering exclusion clauses, the starting point is that the court will try to hold the parties to the contract, as neither party enters a contract with an intention to depart from the terms. In EE v Virgin Mobile, the exclusion clause was clear and unambiguous, which in a case where the contract was carefully negotiated between two parties of similar bargaining power, showed that the parties did not intent to abandon their claims for loss of profit.
One of the biggest takeaways of this case, which should not be a surprise to anyone, is that the clauses negotiated in your contracts all have meaning. Exclusion clauses are especially important as they determine what can and cannot be claimed from the counterparty in the event of a breach of contract.
If you are in any doubt about the terms of your existing contracts, or new ones which you contemplate entering, you should seek specialist legal advice before doing so.
The recent High Court decision in Contract Natural Gas Ltd v ZOG Energy Ltd clarifies that the limitation period for claims against a company does not pause when the company enters administration. This ruling reaffirms the distinction between administration and liquidation in insolvency proceedings.
Contract Natural Gas Ltd sought to recover outstanding payments from ZOG Energy Ltd under a Master Sales Agreement for gas supply. The Master Sales Agreement included a 12-month contractual limitation period for bringing claims.
Both parties entered liquidation in 2021, with ZOG Energy Ltd previously in administration. ZOG Energy Ltd argued that Contract Natural Gas Ltd.’s claims were now time-barred under the Master Sales Agreement.
Contract Natural Gas Ltd put forward the argument that as ZOG Natural Energy Ltd had entered into administration before the 12-month period, the time should stop running and therefore they were not time barred from bringing a claim.
While it is well established that liquidation creates a statutory trust, it was unclear whether administration had the same effect.
Prior to the Enterprise Act 2002, during administration, it was accepted practice that time did not stop running on claims against a company when it went into administration. It was unclear if this had changed with the 2002 Enterprise Act which granted administrators new powers to make distributions to creditors.
It is worth noting that prior to this case, the question of whether entering into administration should stop the limitation period from running had not been considered since the Enterprise Act came into force in 2002. In assisting, the court looked at the 2001 case of Re Maxwell Fleet and Facilities Management Ltd. In this case it was held that administration did not give rise to a statutory trust, therefore the limitation period did not stop running.
The court held that the Enterprise Act 2002 did not alter the initial position regarding limitation periods. As a result, the limitation period for Contract Natural Gas Ltd.’s claim did not stop running when ZOG Energy Ltd went into administration, reflecting the procedure in place prior to the Enterprise Act 2002. Consequently, Contract Natural Gas Ltd was unable to recover its funds from ZOG Energy Ltd.
This ruling provides crucial clarity on limitation periods in administration, confirming that: